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От антиатлантизма — к Большой Евразии:  
место Европы в новом российском евразийстве
Рассматривается эволюция восприятия Европы в евразийском мыш-
лении от классического до неоевразийского; анализируется концепция 
Большой Евразии в рамках современного евразийского мышления.
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This article examines the evolution of the perception of Europe in Eura-
sianist thought from ‘classical’ to ‘neo’ Eurasianism, and analyses the concept 
of Greater Eurasia within the frame of contemporary Eurasianist thinking.
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Eurasianists define Russia in terms of its fundamental distinctions 
from the West. However, the main characteristics, components and even 
the geographical location of the West are perceived in different ways 
by various Eurasianist intellectuals. These differences can be traced both 
at individual and periodical levels. When the Eurasianist intellectual 
movement emerged in the 1920s among the Russian emigres in Europe, 
those first Eurasianists, named as classical Eurasianists, adopted an an-
ti-Western rhetoric, by simply perceiving the West as mainly Western Eu-
rope. The distinction and opposition between the Western European and 
the Russian/Eurasian civilizations were at the main foundation of their 
thinking. For classical Eurasianists, Russia is an Asian/Eurasian country 
and should be closer to Asia than to Europe. Their stance against the Eu-
rope was mainly on civilizational basis and they were against the West 
as a whole: Western individualism, materialism and all Western ways 
of economic, social and political development of humanity. Contrary 
to these Western values, they championed Russian/Eastern way of social 
collectivity, spirituality and tolerance. According to classical Eurasianists, 
Russia should disengage from Europe as much as possible, and develop 
its own Eurasian civilization as an alternative to Europe [1].
At the beginning of 1990s, Eurasianist thought came forward again 
as part of the identity search efforts for the new Russian state. This neo-
Eurasianist movement of post-Soviet era represents both continuity and 
divergence elements regarding the classical Eurasianist thought. Some 
of the neo-Eurasianist thinkers, like Panarin, shares many similarities with 
the classical Eurasianists, especially in terms of his more philosophical 
and civilization based writings. However, the best-known and most pro-
lific neo-Eurasianist thinker Aleksander Dugin shares more dissonances 
than similarities with classical Eurasianists, despite his claims that there 
is continuity between him and the classical Eurasianists. One of the main 
divergences of Dugin’s thoughts from the classical Eurasianists is his 
approach to West and Europe. Unlike classical Eurasianists, he identifies 
West in terms of not civilizational or ideational but geopolitical principles. 
He does not consider West as a single unity, and distinguishes Europe 
from the USA. According to him, now the main enemy of Russia is not 
the European civilization or the West as a whole, but the American po-
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litical, economic and social imperialism and unipolarity. The main goal 
of Eurasianism is to create a common platform for the world to resist 
against Atlanticism. To struggle against American policies, seeking to es-
tablish and maintain a US centered, post-cold war unipolar international 
system, Russia should ally with any actor including European states, 
especially like France and Germany. In accordance with that, in some 
of his writings he mentions about the Moscow — Berlin — Paris axis [1].
Dugin’s Eurasianism is a global geopolitical project, and the bounda-
ries of his Eurasia transcend the geographical and civilizational bounda-
ries of classical Eurasanists’ Eurasia. Moreover, differently from the clas-
sical Eurasianist, his geopolitical notion of Eurasia might include Europe. 
It is not an anti-European, but an anti-Atlantic projection. Although 
Dugin can be criticized and even ignored for his radical, ambiguous and 
inconstant thoughts, still it is worth to refer him, due to the fact that he 
represents a significant shift from the anti-European approach of classical 
Eurasianists. Indeed, in the post-cold war era, in the absence of strict 
ideological and institutional framework of cold war period, Russia would 
develop more intense relations with European states as a historically 
European country.
In accordance with these new realities of contemporary international 
system, a third group of Eurasianist intellectuals, emerged in the contem-
porary Russia, who adopt a more realistic and coherent way of thinking. 
In fact, these scholars, with most prominent figures like Sergey Kara-
ganov [3], Timofey Bordachev [4] and Alexander Lukin [5], cannot be 
literally considered as Eurasianist, but they are proponents of Russia’s 
eastward shift and adoption of Eurasian identity. They can be best iden-
tified as Eurasianist wing of statists. In general they advocate economic 
integration of post-Soviet states under the institutional framework of Eur-
asian Economic Union and Russia’s economic push towards emerging 
Asian markets. Close relations with growing Asian economies would help 
Russia in attracting investment and high technology for the development 
of Russian Far East, and also would provide new markets for Russian 
exports, especially for the Russian defense industry. The Great Eurasian 
project, which was initially declared by Vladimir Putin at the beginning 
of 2010s by aiming to integrate European and Asian economic spaces, 
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shifted its priorities from West to Eastern partnership after Russia — 
EU relations deteriorated in the wake of Ukrainian crisis and Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea. Since the year 2015, the realization of the Great 
Eurasian partnership on the basis of cooperation between two main 
organizations —  the Eurasian Economic Union and the Shanghai Coop-
eration Organization has been the main issue of the Eurasianist agenda.
Although statist Eurasianists advocate Russia’s eastward shift, they 
do not share a fundamentally hostile approach to Europe. In essence, 
they consider Russia as a historically European state. For Karaganov, 
Russia is the country who extended Europe to the Pacific Ocean in the 
19th century [3]. Russia is not the periphery country of Europe but an At-
lantic-Pacific power which would be the center for integration between 
Asia and Europe. For them, Russia is too big to make a choice between 
West and Asia; it should sustain relationship with both and should not 
take any side in a possible future rivalry between them. They argue that 
close relations with emerging economies of Asia would make Russia 
more attractive partner for Europe. Differently from the pro-Western 
liberal Russian elites of early post-Soviet era, they do not presuppose 
that the West is the center of ‘the civilized world’ and Russia should 
fully integrate into the European Union. They advocate a flexible Rus-
sian-European partnership without binding commitments. They support 
to establish direct relations between European Union and the Eurasian 
Economic Union, and they complaints that EU didn’t recognize EEU so 
far. For them, Russia and European states can address problems such 
as immigration, terrorism, religious extremism and economic inequality 
only together within the framework of Great Eurasian partnership.
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Исламский фактор в рамках концепции «Большой Евразии»:  
политико‑демографические аспекты
Проект «Большой Евразии» представляет собой попытку объединить 
в рамках единого пространства территории, относящиеся к разным ци-
вилизациям. Важную роль в этом пространстве будет играть исламская 
цивилизация, которая обладает специфическими демографическими 
характеристиками, поэтому определение возможных социально-полити-
ческих последствий участия ее стран в реализации этого проекта можно 
считать важной задачей.




The Islamic Factor of the “Great Eurasia” Project:  
the Aspects of Political Demography
The project of “Great Eurasia” represents attempt to unite within uniform 
space of the territory, belonging to different civilizations. An important role 
in this space will be played by an Islamic civilization which has the specific 
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